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There is a broad array of literature analyzing the interaction between domestic 
and foreign policy. In this regard, we have recently seen that strategic politicians 
use divisive foreign leaders as a tool to take advantage of in domestic politics. 
Nevertheless, the use of these leaders in domestic campaigns – and particularly 
the reasons why this occurs – has not received much attention in academia. In 
this paper, we attempt to approach this topic by identifying when conditions are 
ripe for this strategic use of foreign leaders in domestic politics. More specifical-
ly, we argue that the image of foreign leaders can be used when they present the 
conditions to become a wedge issue. We explore this question by using survey 
data on views of Chávez across Latin America together with political and eco-
nomic indicators between 2005 and 2011. We find that perceptions of Chav-
ismo are divisive in countries in which the incumbent government is ruled by a 
left-wing administration. Similarly, we show that, in those countries, Chavismo 
has all the conditions to become a wedge issue, as opponents have a homogene-
ously negative perception of that political movement, while government sup-
porters are divided in their views of Chavismo.
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Existe una amplia gama de literatura que analiza la interacción entre la política 
interna y externa. En este sentido, recientemente hemos visto que los políticos 
estratégicos utilizan líderes extranjeros divisivos como una herramienta para 
aprovechar en la política interna. Sin embargo, el uso de estos líderes en cam-
pañas nacionales, y particularmente las razones por las cuales esto ocurre, no ha 
recibido mucha atención en la academia. En este artículo, tratamos de abordar 
este tema identificando cuándo las condiciones están maduras para este uso es-
tratégico de los líderes extranjeros en la política interna. Más específicamente, 
argumentamos que la imagen de los líderes extranjeros puede usarse cuando 
presentan las condiciones para convertirse en un problema de cuña. Explo-
ramos esta pregunta mediante el uso de datos de encuestas sobre puntos de 
vista de Chávez en América Latina junto con indicadores políticos y económicos 
entre 2005 y 2011. Descubrimos que las percepciones del chavismo son divi-
sivas en países en los que el gobierno en funciones está gobernado por una ad-
ministración de izquierda. Del mismo modo, mostramos que, en esos países, el 
chavismo tiene todas las condiciones para convertirse en un problema de cuña, 
ya que los opositores tienen una percepción homogéneamente negativa de ese 
movimiento político, mientras que los partidarios del gobierno están divididos 









Existe uma ampla gama de literatura analisando a interação entre política in-
terna e política externa. Nesse sentido, temos visto recentemente que políti-
cos estratégicos usam líderes estrangeiros divisionistas como uma ferramenta 
para tirar proveito na política doméstica. No entanto, o uso desses líderes em 
campanhas domésticas - e particularmente as razões pelas quais isso ocorre - 
não recebeu muita atenção na academia. Neste artigo, tentamos abordar esse 
tópico identificando quando as condições estão maduras para esse uso estra-
tégico de líderes estrangeiros na política doméstica. Mais especificamente, ar-
gumentamos que a imagem de líderes estrangeiros pode ser usada quando eles 
apresentam condições para se tornar uma questão divisória. Exploramos essa 
questão usando dados de pesquisas sobre visões acerca de Chávez na América 
Latina, juntamente com indicadores políticos e econômicos entre 2005 e 2011. 
Descobrimos que as percepções sobre o Chavismo são divisórias nos países em 
que o governo em exercício é comandado por uma administração de esquerda. 
Da mesma forma, mostramos que, nesses países, o Chavismo tem todas as con-
dições para se tornar uma questão divisória, pois os oponentes têm uma percep-
ção negativa homogênea desse movimento político, enquanto os apoiadores do 
governo estão divididos em suas opiniões sobre o Chavismo.
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INTRODUCTION1
The phenomenon of foreign affairs issues entering domestic debates has sel-
dom been studied in contexts other than that of the United States (for an in-depth 
review, see Aldrich, 2006). This large amount of literature in the United States is 
explained by the US government’s outsized influence throughout the world, mak-
ing foreign policy expertise a must-have for presidential hopefuls. Nevertheless, 
beyond the US, we know little about how foreign affairs can shape local politics. 
In this paper, we argue that foreign affairs can have a space in the domestic realm 
when they meet the conditions to become wedge issues.
A wedge issue can have a major influence over certain segments of the popula-
tion and has the ability to open cracks in the ruling party or coalition. This in con-
trast to issues that polarize the electorate as is. For example, while support for a 
Border Wall in the US or the war on drugs in Colombia might divide and polarize 
the electorate on left and right very clearly, support for affordable health care in 
the US or for the peace process in Colombia will secure the support of the left side 
of the spectrum and open cracks on the right. As such, a wedge issue is an issue that 
without polarizing the current division can create a new majority coalition by divid-
ing those currently in power (Seo, 2010, Giasson and Dumouchel, 2012).
Recent studies have shown that Chavismo has been used as an issue to attack 
left-wing politicians in the vast majority of Latin American countries. Chavismo and 
its invasion of a country’s domestic sphere has been addressed from two perspec-
tives. On one hand, studies have shown that Hugo Chávez’s image has been used 
to criticize some progressive policies by leftist administrations (for instance, see: 
Kitzberger, 2010). On the other hand, Sagarzazu and Mouron (2017) demonstrat-
ed that the relationship with Venezuela has successfully polarized the media and 
public opinion in Argentina along a government-opposition cleavage rather than 
an ideological one. Nevertheless, none of these studies has answered the question 
of why this strategy has been used by the right-wing opposition in Latin America, 
or what its correlates are in public opinion in other countries.
In this paper, we attempt to contribute to the understanding of this complex is-
sue of foreign leaders’ entry into domestic politics by studying the specific dynam-
ics of Chavismo in Latin America. While we understand the uniqueness of this case, 
we also argue that it is not an isolated phenomenon (for instance, fear of Greece’s 
1 Previous versions of this article were presented at the 2016 The CEEISA-ISA joint conference on 
Politics of international relations, the 2016 PSA Annual International Conference, the 8th International 
CEISAL Conference, and the Winter School in Methods and Data Analysis at the Universidad Católica 
del Uruguay. The authors would like to thank Janina Onuki, Francisco Urdiñez, Matheus Soldi Hardt, 
Markus Wagner, the editors, and anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions that sig-
nificantly improved our paper.
| 10 |
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / cc by-nc-nd RLOP. Vol. 9, 1 (2020), 7-34
SAGARZAZU; MOURON
THE MONSTER UNDER THE BED: CHAVISMO AS A WEDGE ISSUE IN LATIN AMERICA
Syriza was used in Portugal and Spain; Vladimir Putin’s involvement in the 2016 
US election; and the use that will be made – we presume – of Donald Trump’s im-
age in future elections), and thus, it deserves attention. As noted previously, it is 
public knowledge that Chavismo and the image of Chávez have been utilized nega-
tively in Latin American countries. Thus, this paper attempts to answer the follow-
ing question: Why is Chavismo an attractive issue in domestic politics? We argue 
that this use occurs because – in some contexts – it can be electorally strategic. 
Specifically, Chavismo has all the characteristics of a wedge issue, one that divides 
supporters in one political camp while keeping those of the other united (Giasson 
and Dumouchel, 2012).
The contribution of this paper is twofold. First, it is an exploration of whether 
foreign policy topics can become wedge issues, i.e. whether the conditions in public 
opinion are such that they allow politicians for this strategy if they so choose. We 
believe this to be important because if public opinion sees no difference of opinion 
on a given issue, then it won’t matter much what politicians do. Second, while much 
has been said about Chavez and Chavismo in the context of Latin American politics 
this is the first quantitative analysis to our knowledge which has been carried out 
across the region that shows where differences in the view of Chavismo exist, and 
what can explain these differences. This is important because while the opinion 
divide can be assumed to exist, or believed to be obvious by many, up until know 
there hasn’t been an exploration of it.
Just as we clarify what our contribution is, we do for what this paper is not. 
Due to lack of rhetoric by politicians this paper is not an analysis of the uses of 
Chavismo as a wedge issue. While we use clear punctual examples of the uses of 
Chavism in electoral contexts in the region we aren’t theorizing why politicians and 
parties will use it or not. Instead, we borrow from the literature on wedge issues as 
a way to explain that foreign policy topics can be used as wedge issues because the 
conditions are there for it, i.e. the split in public opinion and the diversity of views 
in one side.
To test whether conditions exist for Chavismo to become a wedge issue in Latin 
America, we use data from 7 Latinobarómetro waves, together with political and 
economic statistics, compiled from a wide array of sources in an attempt to control 
for important confounders. Our findings show that Chavismo is a divisive issue in 
countries ruled by center-left administrations. In turn, we also find that Chavismo is 
a topic that has all the conditions to become a wedge issue, as opponents of leftist 
administrations have homogeneously negative perceptions of it, while supporters’ 
views vary widely. These findings pose interesting questions regarding the effect 
of a country’s local politics in a broader region that are not necessarily limited to 
the negative effect of Chávez’s image in Latin America.
This paper is structured as follows. The next section presents a theoretical dis-
cussion regarding the use of issues for political gain in the political realm, focusing 
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specifically on the strategies opponents employ to break governing coalitions. In 
this regard, it argues that opposition parties are particularly likely to use wedge 
issues for such a purpose. Second, it contextualizes our research, explaining how 
leftist administrations in Latin America have been associated in the last decade, 
and presents the hypotheses. In the third section, it describes the dataset con-
structed from 7 Latinobarómetro waves, retrieving data between 2005 and 2011, 
together with data regarding UN roll call votes, economic indicators, and parlia-
mentary elites. In the fourth section, it shows that, where left-wing administrations 
rule, Chavismo is a divisive issue. Additionally, these perceptions appear to be more 
diverse within political blocks; supporters of left-wing governments demonstrate a 
more inconsistent range of views, making Chavismo a theme with all the conditions 
of becoming a wedge issue. Finally, the article’s findings are discussed, consider-
ing that, while they are relevant for Latin America, the example of a foreign issue 
being advantage of in the domestic realm can be extrapolated to cases outside the 
region.
A DIVIDE AND CONQUER STRATEGY
In one-dimensional political scenarios, two party competition must necessar-
ily converge on the median voter (Downs, 1957). However, societies are far more 
complex than this, and normally more than one issue is relevant in the political 
debate (Albright, 2010). Consequently, political parties behave like large organi-
zations or coalitions of many different partners, sometimes containing opposing 
interests (Kirchheimer, 1990; Aldrich, 1995). At the same time, voters with com-
plex preferences can support a party with which they disagree on a particular issue 
because a topic closer to their ideology at that moment stands out in the politi-
cal debate; these are what Hillygus and Shields (2014: 7) have called «persuadable 
voters».
There is a significant group of studies that, while understanding the existence 
of this complex reality and type of voters, have examined the strategic commu-
nications of political parties that selectively highlight issues in order to gain po-
litical office (for instance, see Budge and Farlie, 1983; Petrocik, 1996). The two 
basic tenets of this literature state that parties can be strategic and play to their 
partisan advantages, or that they can be responsive to public preferences. Stud-
ies aligned with the former argument are based on the understanding that issues 
can be owned (Petrocik, 1996). This ownership emerges from the historical roots 
of the party, its traditional constituencies, or its performance in office (Petrocik 
1996; Budge and Farlie 1983). In more personalistic systems, ownership can also 
be gained through candidates’ personal characteristics (Arbour, 2013). However, 
parties cannot always choose to play to their partisan strengths (Vavreck, 2009; 
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Sagarzazu and Pardos-Prado, 2015; Klüver and Spoon, 2014; Spoon and Klüver, 
2014, 2015b; Wagner and Meyer, 2014; Klüver and Sagarzazu, 2016), and, in cas-
es in which they do not, it is argued that they are being responsive and ‘riding the 
wave’ of public opinion (Ansolabehere and Iyengar 1994).
Nevertheless, parties do not always follow these two strategies, as they can 
also bring new issues into the discussion in order to change the structure of compe-
tition (Riker, 1996; Carmines and Stimson 1986,1989; Hobolt and de Vries, 2015). 
Such ‘issue entrepreneurs’ are typically those in the minority in a two-party system 
(Carmines and Stimson 1986,1989), or those in a losing position in a multiparty 
system (Hobolt and de Vries, 2015). By raising new issues, parties not only differ-
entiate themselves from their competitors, but also attempt to change the political 
dynamics.
Given these possibilities, parties will adopt different strategies in order to pre-
vail in political debates. On one hand, those governing will seek to maintain their 
majority and therefore face restrictions in terms of issue entrepreneurship (i.e. 
they shouldn’t be adding new issues to their politics). On the other hand, those in 
the opposition can mobilize new issues, especially if these issues divide the gov-
erning coalition, thus attracting possible voters to their side (Green-Pedersen and 
Mortensen, 2010; Van de Wart et al., 2014). As a consequence, instability in the 
composition of governing coalitions is the fundamental reason explaining why 
minority parties – when unable to win with their own base of support – resort to 
strategies designed to break up the majority coalition (Jeong et al., 2011; Hillygus 
and Shields, 2014).
This divide and conquer strategy revolves around what a longstanding body 
of literature has defined as wedge issues. A wedge issue is a topic that has a major 
influence over certain segments of the population, without necessarily polarizing 
the electorate (Giasson and Dumouchel, 2012). While a wedge issue cannot be eas-
ily subsumed into the dominant dimension of the party system, it has the ability to 
open cracks in the ruling party or coalition without simultaneously causing much 
damage to its mobilizer (Seo, 2010). For instance, when Chávez first ran for presi-
dent in 1998, his main platform was a re-founding of the Venezuelan state through 
a new constitution. This issue was highly popular in that period, not only in circles 
that supported Chávez, but also among supporters of other candidates. The main 
difference was that Chávez was calling for a constituent assembly, while support-
ers of the main opposition candidate wanted Congress to make the changes – if in-
deed there were to be any (Pereira Almao, 2004 p. 153). However, while Chávez 
embraced change in his platform, the other candidates did not – i.e., they did not 
support a re-write of the Constitution – leaving Chávez as the only standard bearer 
of reform (even if it was radical reform). Thus, this strategy – instead of being one of 
pandering to the base – is designed to undermine the base support of a political op-
ponent by adding an issue that splits it (Snyder, 2009; Wilson and Turnbull, 2001).
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Wedge issues, however, lie dormant in the political realm and, in order to have 
any effect on political debate, they must be intentionally constructed and activated 
by a political player (Wiant, 2002: 276). Hence, there are two ways in which wedge 
issues can be used against a party: they can be activated to exploit differences in 
the opposing coalition or used to convince «persuadable voters» that the other 
party will ignore their preferences.
Wedge issue strategies have been used since the late 19th century, when 
Democrats in the U.S. raised the topic of Chinese immigration to erode support 
for the Republican Party (Seo 2010). Since then, studies of contemporary politics 
have highlighted a barrage of issues that have been utilized as wedges in political 
debates. This extensive list includes issues such as abortion (Adams, 1997), immi-
gration (Green-Pedersen and Krogstrup, 2008; Jeong et al., 2011), gay marriage 
(Smith et al., 2005), gun laws (Giasson and Dumouchel, 2012), racial issues (Car-
mines and Stimson, 1989; Abramowitz, 1994), and European integration (Marks 
and Wilson, 2000; Kriesi, 2007; Tzelgov, 2014).
More in keeping with our research agenda, Snyder et al. (2009) analyzed how 
foreign issues can be used as wedge issues. The authors suggest that the most com-
mon strategy for using this type of topic as a wedge issue is to emphasize looming 
foreign threats that are alleged to overshadow domestic class divisions (Snyder et 
al., 2009).
Foreign ‘threats’ are particularly attractive to politicians for several reasons. 
First, the public is less informed about foreign issues than domestic issues (Lipp-
mann, 1932; Mueller, 2002). Second, the media tends to marginalize foreign news 
(Aalberg et al, 2013), and what they report on tends to index the views of politi-
cians (Bennett, 1990; Entman, 20013, 2004). As such, it will be easier for informed 
politicians to make a case for why a foreign country or its leader poses a threat to 
the domestic electorate. Second, because of the rise in mediatized political person-
alization where media coverage of foreign countries focuses largely on heads of 
state «at the expense of the countries as such» (Balmas and Sheafer, 2013 p. 468), 
this is particularly true of charismatic leaders (Balmas and Sheafer, 2014). Third, 
for opposition politicians in particular, it is worthwhile to associate the incumbent 
with a foreign leader that can be portrayed as a threat because incumbent govern-
ments are in charge of foreign affairs and thus must make decisions on how closely 
they are allied with other nations. A strategic opposition can thus use these ties to 
associate the incumbent administration with a foreign country that is perceived 
negatively in the domestic realm.
This combined theoretical insight leads us to formulate our broader hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: the conditions for a foreign threat to become a wedge issue in the domestic 
realm will exist in countries governed by a party (or coalition) that is ideologically close 
to the ‘threat’.
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Taking this theoretical discussion as reference, in the next section, we will 
analyze the specific case of Latin American administrations and their association 
with Hugo Chávez. Furthermore, we will use the hypothesis stated above to test 
whether Chavismo has the conditions to become a wedge issue in Latin America.
FEAR OF CHAVIZACIÓN AS A DOMESTIC ELECTORAL TOOL
In 1998, Hugo Chávez inaugurated a series of victories by left-wing presidents 
in Latin America. During the following eight years, a considerable number of re-
gional administrations turned «red» in what authors have called Latin America’s 
left turn (Petkoff, 2005). As a consequence, authors began to analyze these admin-
istrations comparatively, and while they did not arrive at the same conclusions, 
they agreed that there should be a distinction between different types of leftist 
governments, ranging from moderates to radicals, the latter led by Chávez’s exam-
ple (Gallegos, 2005; Castañeda, 2006; Leiras, 2007; Levistky and Murillo, 2008).
Meanwhile, this association with Chavismo made other authors question the 
implications for leftist governments of approaching Caracas (for instance, see 
Paramio, 2006; Nielsen, 2009; Kitzberger, 2010; or Sagarzazu and Mouron, 2017). 
While Chávez’ contagious leftist ideology has been perceived by Washington as 
making Latin American regimes less receptive to US policies and objectives (Niels-
en, 2009), most of the aforementioned studies analyzed the degree to which po-
larization in Venezuela, or negative views of the Venezuelan leader, could be used 
in domestic politics in other Latin American countries.
Nevertheless, we argue that Chavismo is not a simple divisive issue explained 
by the degree of support it enjoys among local governments. Kitzberger (2010) was 
the first to suggest that the use of Chavismo in domestic politics was tied in par-
ticular to left-of-center governments that attempted to pursue more progressive 
policies, specifically regarding the media system. Similarly, Sagarzazu and Mouron 
(2017) recently demonstrated that this argument applies to the Argentinean case, 
where the opposition press has since 2008 steadily sought to associate Chavismo 
and Kirchnerismo in a negative way in order to criticize the latter.
These finding posit interesting questions: Why have tightening relations with 
Chavismo been so costly for center-left governments? While not for right-wing ad-
ministrations? We believe the answer to this question is threefold.
First, the Chavismo has a mixed record of leftist policies. When elected, and 
during its first years, Chavismo was strongly supported by most elements of the 
Venezuelan (and Latin American) left (Lopez-Maya 2011, Strønen, 2017). Its 
promise to incorporate the forgotten, to re-construct the state in a more inclusive 
manner, and to expand and improve the welfare state were in line with the left’s 
goals after the policies of the Washington Consensus (Ellner and Hellinger, 2003). 
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However, these progressive pushes were not always fully realized and where often 
met with increased authoritarian practices, an erratic economic policy, and an un-
inspiring and disorganized opposition (Banon, 2014; Buxton, 2019). As such, while 
many – on the left – can side and support with the narrative that Chavez incorpo-
rated the «forgotten» to the electorate and to the political life, there is less consist-
ent public support for the authoritarianism and sharp turn to the left in the later 
years of his administration.
Second, the media – in Latin America and elsewhere – has provided an almost 
homogeneously negative view of Chavismo (Kitzberger, 2010). For instance, in an 
analysis of news stories published by the BBC, Salter and Weltman (2011) conclude 
that the outlet fails to analyze the emergence of Chávez as a «political response to 
historical conditions», but instead presents it as «an unruly mob reacting to, and led 
by, the ‘totalitarian autocrat’» (261). Similarly, in a comparison of coverage of Ven-
ezuela and Bolivia, Lupien (2013) and Young (2013) view coverage of Venezuela 
as distinct from that of other countries of the «good left» (Brazil, Uruguay, Chile) 
and similar to countries portrayed as the «bad left» (Bolivia, Ecuador, Nicaragua). 
Therefore, if we take into account the fact that the media strongly influences pub-
lic opinion regarding foreign issues (Hill, 2003), it is expected that citizens will – on 
average – have a negative view of Chavismo.
Second, incumbent governments must manage foreign affairs, and, as such, are 
required to take positions regarding other countries. To be or not to be friendly, 
that is the question. Therefore, if we consider that Chavismo is situated on the left 
side of the Latin American ideological spectrum (Saiegh, 2015) and that the left in 
Latin America is deeply divided on issues (Cannon, 2016), this can cause problems 
for center-left administrations in the region when dealing with their neighbor. Get-
ting closer to Chavismo can please their more leftist followers, while frightening 
those in the center who may not agree with Venezuelan policies and rhetoric. In 
contrast, when the right wing is in power, these governments can foment public 
opinion portraying Venezuela and Chavismo in a negative light without worrying 
that this will displease their electorate.
These two dynamics can confuse government supporters as they perceive con-
flicting reports: a negative view of Chávez from most media outlets and a positive view 
of Chávez from the government. This, of course, is mediated by the proximity of the 
government to Chávez and the intensity with which the media criticizes Chavismo.
Thus, we suggest: 
Hypothesis: The conditions for Chavismo to become a wedge issue will exist in countries 
governed by a left-of-center party (or coalition).
Therefore, if – as our hypothesis states – the conditions for Chavismo to be-
come a wedge issue, two related dynamics must be present. First, differing views 
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of Chavismo must exist within a country (there must be a space for a divisive issue, 
as stated in Hypothesis 1), and second, the target group must have less consistent 
views on the issue than the group that mobilizes the issue. That is, the distribu-
tion of preferences must be wider in the group under attack, effectively opening 
up space for a wedge issue. As such, left-wing government supporters will be more 
likely to have inconsistent views regarding Chavismo, while right-wing opponents 
will have a homogeneously negative perception of Chávez and the Venezuelan 
government. In fact, this inconsistency among left-wing government supporters 
would explain why opponents in those countries take advantage of Chavismo in the 
domestic realm, as they know it is an issue that divides the ruling coalition but does 
not affect their own. As such we define our two corollaries from our hypothesis: 
Corollary 1: Supporters and opponents of the government will differ in their views of 
Chavismo
Corollary 2: Supporters of the government will have a wider variation in their views of 
Chavismo, than government opponents.
In the next section, we will explain how we will test our hypotheses and their 
two necessary conditions.
DATA
To test the hypothesis presented in the previous section, we created a unique 
time series cross-sectional dataset with observations for 17 Latin American coun-
tries for each year between 2005 and 2011. One significant aspect of this dataset 
is that it must provide not only a measure of public opinion (to serve as the depend-
ent variable in our hypothesis), but also a measure of the complexity of domestic 
and foreign relations. As such, we obtained independent measures of government 
ideology (from the Project on Parliamentary Elites in Latin America), ideal points 
for the political orientations of Latin American administrations (based on UN vot-
ing data), trade with Venezuela (from the UN Comtrade Database), and data on in-
ternal polarization, ideology, and demographics (from Latinobarómetro). This mix 
of data, while varied, provides the leverage we need. We will proceed to describe 
it in detail below.
Dependent variables
As we are measuring the extent to which views of Chavismo can create space 
for this topic to be used as a wedge issue, we will use the Latinobarómetro survey as 
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a reference. This public opinion research is carried out annually by the non-profit, 
non-governmental Latinobarómetro Corporation, which uses local firms to apply 
the same survey instrument in 18 Latin American countries and Spain (a total of 19 
countries). The sample in each country is representative of 100% of its population 
and oscillates between 1,000 and 1,200 respondents, providing a good representa-
tive sample of the region’s inhabitants. As such, the Latinobarómetro survey has 
consistently been used to measure public opinion in Latin America (for instance, 
see Jones, 2010; Lewis-Beck and Ratto, 2013; Saiegh 2015).
In addition to its representativeness and wide use from 2005 to 2011, the Lat-
inobarómetro survey included a battery of questions evaluating presidents in the 
region including Chávez as well as leaders from other countries (such as King Juan 
Carlos of Spain). Respondents were asked to evaluate these leaders on an 11-point 
scale ranging from Very Bad (0) to Very Good (10). Using this measure, we cre-
ated the two dependent variables necessary to test both components of our hy-
potheses, namely, a measure to evaluate whether significantly differing views of 
Chávez exist between supporters and opponents of the incumbent government, 
and a measure to test whether these views are mostly similar or dissimilar within 
each group.
To capture the extent to which views of Chávez differ between government 
supporters and opponents, we averaged the responses by these two groups (per 
country year), thus creating our average evaluation of Hugo Chávez. Figure 1 shows 
this measure for 17 countries (excluding Venezuela). As can be seen, there is wide 
variation. For the most part, countries closer to Venezuela (ALBA members, for ex-
ample) reflect greater distance between government supporters and opponents. 
In turn, these views react to changes in government ideology (for example, El Sal-
vador in 2009 when the left reached power, or Chile in 2010 when the right gained 
power) and relevant political events (the 2010 coup in Honduras affected views of 
Chávez in Mexico, Nicaragua, and Honduras, for instance). For the most part, we 
see countries with very divergent views and countries with significant consistency 
of evaluations.
To test our second corollary, we must be able to estimate the degree to which 
evaluations vary within government opponents and supporters. To measure the 
consistency of evaluations of Chavismo, we obtained the percentage of responses 
that fell within one standard deviation of the mean for each ‘case.’ While the stand-
ard deviation may provide a good measure of dispersion, it does not measure how 
that dispersion exists. As such, two – or more – distributions can have the same 
standard deviation but very different spreads of observations. For our purposes, 
the higher the percentage of observations falling within one standard deviation 
of the mean, the greater the consistency in views of Chávez in that subset of the 
population. Similarly, the lower the percentage of observations falling within one 
























































































































































































Figure 2. Consistency of Chávez’s evaluations by country and year
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Figure 2 shows the distribution of the estimated consistency measure for all 
countries in our sample, distinguishing between government opponents (dashed 
line) and supporters (solid line). As can be seen, in countries historically associated 
with Chavismo (such as Ecuador, Bolivia and Argentina), the percentage of obser-
vations within one standard deviation of the mean (consistency coefficients) is 
much lower for government supporters than opponents, meaning that perceptions 
of Chávez are more varied among supporters of leftist Latin American administra-
tions than among opponents. In contrast, in countries ruled by center and right-
of-center political administrations (Paraguay and Panama, for instance), govern-
ment opponents and supporters have the same distribution of perceptions. Finally, 
although no less important, we can see that, in countries where extreme political 
events occurred (for example, the change in government in Peru or coup in Hondu-
ras), during those years, perceptions among supporters of leftist rulers were much 
more widespread than among opponents.
Our unit of analysis is the country-year level; for each country-year, we pos-
sess values of average evaluations and consistency for both government support-
ers and opponents.
Explanatory variables
Having defined our dependent variables, we can proceed to create our two ex-
planatory variables, i) support for the government, and ii) president’s ideology.
Government supporters are those respondents who approve how the govern-
ment led by the President is running the country. While not a direct metric of sup-
port it is the closest available variable and furthermore a significant predictor of 
support.
As we are interested in assessing internal political dynamics for each country/
year to measure presidents’ domestic ideological positions, we used data from the 
Project on Parliamentary Elites in Latin America (PELA). This initiative, carried 
out by the University of Salamanca since 1994, estimates ideological positions for 
parties by conducting personal interviews with deputies from all Latin American 
countries. Specifically, deputies are asked to locate themselves and other relevant 
political actors on a spectrum from left (0) to right (10). Using this data, we con-
structed our second explanatory variable (left-of-center president) which measured 
whether the president was on the left (1), or not (0)2. Figure 3 shows the average 
view of Chávez based on whether or not a country has a left-of-center president. 
2 We measured against the middle of the scale (5), as a left-of-center president is one with a position 
of less than 5.
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As can be seen, countries with leftist presidents have more widely differing views 
of Chávez than countries with right-of-center presidents.
Figure 3. Average view of Chávez per year
Control Variables
Having described our key independent variables, we can now explain our con-
trol variables. First, in order to control for political closeness between the Chávez 
administration and its Latin American counterparts, we use ideal point estimates 
of voting in the United Nations General Assembly (Bailey et al 2015). This measure 
of foreign policy positions allows us to determine how close governments are to 
one another ideologically; as such, this measure allows us to obtain the location of 
Latin American countries compared to each other, and specifically vis-à-vis Ven-
ezuela3. Figure 4 shows the evolution of these scores from 2005 to 2011 for both 
right-of-center and left-of-center governments. The dashed line represents the lo-
cation of Venezuela’s government, while the circles show the different Latin Amer-
ican countries. Two clear dynamics can be seen: first, countries were much closer 
3 Ideal points have been used extensively in the literature to measure foreign policy positions and 
closeness between countries (for instance, see Rieselbach, 1960; Bailey et al 2015; Steiner 2014).
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in 2005 than in 2011, and second, Venezuela has consistently led this dispersion 
throughout these years, with some of the close followers being Bolivia, Ecuador, 
and Nicaragua. A final point worth mentioning is that a nucleus of left-of-center 
governments exists that follows Chávez, while a second group behaves such as 
right-of-center governments. Using this measure, we estimate the distance from 
Venezuela as the absolute distance between each country’s annual score and Ven-
ezuela’s score for the same year.
Figure 4. Location of Latin American countries 2005-2011
Second, because much political closeness comes from economic closeness, we 
measure economic relations with Venezuela. We control for economic closeness 
using data regarding bilateral economic relations between Venezuela and 17 other 
Latin American countries4. To measure how economically relevant Venezuela is for 
each Latin American country, we calculated the proportion of exports to Venezuela 
in relation to total exports to the world for each country and normalized it by using 
the log function, as it was particularly skewed for larger countries. A second vari-
able of interest created was trade balance, which is a dummy considering whether 
trade flows between Venezuela and each nation yielded a surplus for the country 
4 These data were retrieved from the UN Comtrade Database (http: //comtrade.un.org).
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at hand (1) or instead benefited Venezuela, in which case it would mean a deficit for 
the other country (0).
Finally, we must further control for domestic political dynamics that can in-
fluence a government’s behavior, such as polarization, the ideological location of 
a country’s population, and its average socio-economic status. To control for the 
degree to which domestic polarization exists in each country, we used the stan-
dard deviation of respondents’ left-right placements (as suggested by Ezrow et al 
(2014). To control for the overall location of voters, we estimated the mean ideo-
logical location on the left-right spectrum in each country. For both of these mea-
sures, we used the ideological self-identification question (0-left to 10-right) for 
each country/year from Latinobarómetro data. Finally, to control for a country’s 
average socio-economic situation, we estimated the mean socioeconomic status per 
country/year. To estimate this value, we used Latinobarómetro data on the condi-
tion of respondents’ homes5. These questions provide an overview of items that 
signal a higher standard of living, and thus higher socioeconomic status. Moreover, 
and as previously done in other studies (for instance, see Singer and Carlin, 2013; 
Kasara and Suryanarayan, 2015), we used factor analysis to generate a measure 
for each respondent and averaged these by country per year6.
RESULTS
Having constructed the dataset, the next task is to test our hypotheses. To 
examine under what circumstances Chavismo can become a wedge issue in Latin 
America, we must first see whether citizens have differing views of Chavismo de-
pending on whether they support or oppose their own country’s government. First, 
we evaluate the degree to which being ideologically closer to Venezuela causes 
perceptions of Chavismo to be more polarized; or, in other words, whether it makes 
supporters and opponents have distant and differing views of Chávez. Second, we 
test to what extent government supporters have less consistent views of Chavismo 
in countries governed by leftist administrations. For both tests, we will employ a 
linear regression with clustered errors by country.
5 The items included questions asked in all country/years regarding whether the respondent’s home 
had sewage, hot water, drinking water, phone service, a washing machine, fridge, or computer; we also 
included whether the respondent had a car or owned their home. The specific question reads, «Do you 
or any member of your family have any of the following goods?» and is followed by the list of goods.
6 Additional models also controlled for the average level of support for democracy and satisfaction 
with democracy as measured by the Latinobarómetro survey. However, for parsimony – and because 
the results of our simple model hold – we decided to not include these. Results will be provided upon 
request.
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As stated previously, our first model will test the degree to which space for 
Chavismo to become a divisive issue is dependent on the government’s ideological 
orientation (H1). To test this hypothesis, we will regress the mean evaluation of 
Chávez in each country considering whether the president is right of center or left 
of center. We regress our dependent variable on whether respondents were gov-
ernment supporters (1) or opponents (0). We expect that government opponents 
of left-of-center presidents will have lower average evaluations than supporters 
of left-of-center presidents and that the opposite will be true of right-of-center 
presidents. In addition to these variables, we control for other factors that could 
influence this relationship, such as political closeness between administrations, 
internal polarization, trade closeness, and the overall ideological location of re-
spondents in each country.
The results of this first analysis are reported in Table 1. As expected, in coun-
tries ruled by left-wing parties, political closeness to Venezuela opens up space 
between government supporters and opponents in their views of Chavismo. All 
else being equal, in these countries, government supporters have a more positive 
perception of Chávez than opponents. We can see this relationship in Figure 5, in 
which we predict Chávez’s average evaluation using simulated values, as suggest-
ed by King, Tomz and Wittenberg (2000). The left-hand side of the graph shows 
predictions for supporters and opponents of left-of-center presidents and the 
95% confidence interval around the estimates. The right-hand side shows simi-
lar estimates for right-of-center presidents. In the latter cases, we see that where 
right-of-center presidents are in power, differences in views of Chávez among 
government supporters and opponents are not statistically significant. This differ-
ence increases significantly under left-of-center presidents, as the average view of 
Chávez decreases (becomes worse) for opponents and increases for supporters.
Another interesting finding is that, while support for right-of-center adminis-
trations is not significant, their ideological proximity to Venezuela is, in fact, sig-
nificant (a variable that is not significant for leftist presidents). Supporters and 
opponents of right-of-center administrations that are more distant ideologically 
from Venezuela have worse views of Chávez than do those that are closer. In other 
words, in countries ruled by right-wing administrations with foreign policies that 
are politically close to Chavismo, citizens have better perceptions of the Venezue-
lan regime than in countries politically distant from Caracas. The only other vari-
able that is significant in these models is socio-economic status, which only affects 
right-wing administrations. Where citizens have the lowest average socio-eco-
nomic status (SES), they have a better perception of Chávez. This is consistent with 
what one would expect considering Chávez’s heavy discursive emphasis on the 
poor and disparities in the region.
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Table 1. Regression with country clustered standard errors for explaining 
Average evaluations of Hugo Chávez



































Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.
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Figure 5. Predicted Chávez Evaluation based on results reported in Table 1
Left−of−center Right−of−center












Having demonstrated that space for Chavismo to become a divisive issue ex-
ists in countries with left-of-center presidents, we can move on to test our second 
corollary, which is that countries where the left governs will also have more space 
for Chavismo to become a wedge issue. To carry out this test, we looked at the con-
sistency of views in both groups – left-of-center and right-of-center governments 
– and used the same independent variables that were used previously. To measure 
consistency within groups, we used the percentage of respondents that fell within 
one standard deviation of the mean view of Chávez (as described above). A low-
er percentage indicates greater inconsistency in the distribution of views among 
members of the group. As such, we are examining whether greater political close-
ness with Venezuela makes views of Chávez more cohesive among government 
opponents (higher percentage) than government supporters.
Table 2 shows the results of the analysis of the consistency of views in each 
group (left-of-center and right-of-center presidents). As can be seen, government 
opponents in countries with left-of-center presidents have more consistent views 
than supporters, for which the coefficient is larger; once again, being more politi-
cally distant from Venezuela does not make views of Chávez more cohesive ceteris 
paribus. We can further see this relationship in Figure 6, where we predict the con-
sistency of Chávez’s evaluations, as before. The left-hand side of the graph shows 
predictions for left-of-center presidents and the 95% confidence interval around 
the estimates, while the right-hand side shows predictions for right-of-center 
presidents. The space for Chavismo to become a wedge issue can be seen clearly 
in this figure in the difference in consistency between opponents and supporters 
of left-of-center presidents. As expected, views of Chávez among government op-
ponents are more consistent than among government supporters.
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Table 2. Regression with country clustered standard errors for explaining within 
group Consistency of evaluations of Hugo Chávez

































Note: Standard errors in parenthesis. Significance level * p<0.1, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01
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Figure 6. Predicted Group Consistency of Chávez Evaluation based on results 
reported in Table 2
Left−of−center Right−of−center
















Even after Chávez’s death, authors have recently shown that concepts such 
as Chavización and Venezuelización continue to be used as a strategy in domestic 
debates in Argentina (Sagarzazu and Mouron, 2017)7. Therefore, the main objec-
tive of our study was to expand this analysis to 17 Latin American countries and 
examine whether and why Chavismo can be used as a tool to take advantage of in 
domestic politics. As Kitzberger (2010) suggested seven years ago, we corroborate 
with empirical data the fact that Chavismo has all the conditions to operate as a 
wedge issue. Further analysis, however, with individual survey data together with 
political advertisements collected during election campaigns could further expand 
this analysis by looking at the effectiveness of this approach as a campaign mech-
anism. Similarly, analysis of communications of political actors can further expand 
the findings of this study. Regardless, however, this paper’s findings opens an in-
teresting discussion.
In the first place, and leaving aside our case study, our findings posit some con-
cerns regarding the foreign policy formulation process itself. Since its inception in 
7 The authors show that, between 2010 to 2015, one of the main Argentine newspapers published 6 
editorials and 16 opinion pieces using the idea of Chavización in order to negatively compare the Argen-
tine and Venezuelan administrations.
| 29 |
Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca / cc by-nc-nd RLOP. Vol. 9, 1 (2020), 7-34
SAGARZAZU; MOURON
THE MONSTER UNDER THE BED: CHAVISMO AS A WEDGE ISSUE IN LATIN AMERICA
the 1930s, public opinion literature suggested that the average citizen would have 
little interest in international affairs (Lippmann, 1932; Almond, 1970), which in turn 
partly explains why public opinion historically has not influenced foreign policy for-
mulation (Jacobs and Page, 2005). Nevertheless, as processes of economic liberali-
zation and global governance have increasingly included civil society in discussions 
on international policy issues, in democratic regimes, public perceptions constrain 
foreign policy choices at critical moments (Foyle, 2004). For instance, more recent 
articles have shown that foreign policy issues have turned repeatedly into elector-
al agenda items (Holsti, 1992; Aldrich et al., 2006), while at the same time, as stated 
in the theoretical discussion, foreign threats can be used to overshadow domestic 
class divisions and taken advantage of in the domestic realm (Snyder et al., 2009). 
Additionally, if foreign issues are introduced in electoral debates and possess the 
conditions to be used as a wedge issue, as shown in this article, the creation of such 
cleavages will have an impact on the foreign policy formulation process.
Second, regarding our region of analysis, if, as we have demonstrated, Chavismo 
can be used as a wedge issue in Latin America, this may affect foreign policy strate-
gies toward Venezuela. Strengthened ties with Caracas appear to have a domestic 
political cost, even when this would be extremely beneficial for a country’s econ-
omy. For example, due to opposition from right-wing parties in the Brazilian and 
Paraguayan Congresses, the process of incorporation of Venezuela into Mercosur 
took more than seven years, even when all members of the bloc had a trade surplus 
with their Caribbean neighbor and such an agreement promised new business op-
portunities. Similarly, the outcome of a challenging peace negotiation in Colombia 
between the Santos government and the FARC was narrowly defeated in a refer-
endum in which the opposition highlighted the relationship between the FARC, 
Cuba, and the already deceased Hugo Chávez8. In sum, even after Chávez’s pass-
ing, it is politically costly for Latin American rulers to present an image of closeness 
with Caracas to their electorates, which may affect regional political dynamics.
Finally, if – as we have shown – a foreign topic can be taken advantage of in 
domestic politics, this strategy likely is not limited to Chavismo and Latin America. 
Specific studies are needed, but we expect that the same may apply to other con-
troversial countries and international figures such as Russia’s Putin and neighbor-
ing states or the effect of Syriza’s win in Greece and subsequent support for new 
parties in Spain. The key is to determine the appropriate cleavage into which the 
foreign topic falls. In the end, as we are moving toward a globalized world in which 
the boundaries between domestic and international affairs appear increasingly 
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Therefore, more comparative research on these new types of interactions will be 
needed to understand these dynamics.
On this point it is good to acknowledge that our test is done in a system of pres-
idential democracies. These regimes have their own unique characteristics about 
clarity of accountability (Powell and Whitten, 1993), personalized elections (Sam-
uels, 2002) and popularity (Carlin et al. 2018), among others. As such this might 
make our theory less applicable to other non-presidential contexts. However, giv-
en the increase in personalization of politics in some parliamentary systems (Holtz-
Barcha et al. 2014, Langer 2011, Langer Sagarzazu 2018, Karvonen 2010) it might 
just be the case that our argument might travel -with some caveats- to some highly 
personalized parliamentary system.
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